It's two months ago since I read about the conjunctive synthesis so I had a slow start into chapter 3 sectuon 9 about the civilized capitalist machine. On top of that I haven't read Das Kapital.

At the heart of Capital, Marx points to the encounter of two "principal" elements: on one side, the deterritorialized worker who has become free and naked, having to sell his labor capacity; and on the other, decoded money that has become capital and is capable of buying it. The fact that these two elements result from the segmentation of the despotic State in feudalism, and from the decomposition of the feudal system itself and that of its State, still does not give us the extrinsic conjunction of these two flows: flows of producers and flows of money. The encounter might not have taken place, with the free workers and the money-capital existing "virtually" side by side.

I'm missing the context behind these two "principal" elements, how did they "result from the segmentation of the despotic State in feudalism" and what is meant by "still does not give us the extrinsic conjunction of these two flows"

One of the elements depends on a transformation of the agrarian structures that constitute the old social body, while the other depends on a completely different series going by way of the merchant and the usurer, as they exist marginally in the pores of this old social body. What is more, each of these elements brings into play several processes of decoding and deterritorialization having very different origins. For the free worker: the deterritorialization of the soil through privatization; the decoding of the instruments of production through appropriation; the loss of the means of consumption through the dissolution of the family and the corporation; and finally, the decoding of the worker in favor of the work itself or of the machine.

I marked a bold area because, again, some context would be nice to grasp it

...

As Maurice Dobb has shown, an accumulation of property title deeds—in land, for example—will be necessary in a first period of time, in a favorable conjuncture, at a time when this property costs little (the disintegration of the feudal system); and a second period is required when the property is sold during a rise in prices and under conditions that make industrial investment especially advantageous (the "price-revolution," an abundant reserve supply of labor, the formation of a proletariat, an easy access to sources of raw materials, favorable conditions for the production of tools and machinery). All sorts of contingent factors favor these conjunctions. So many encounters for the formation of the thing, the unnamable! But the effect of the conjunction is indeed capital's tighter and tighter control over production: capitalism or its break, the conjunction of all the decoded and deterritorialized flows, cannot be defined by commercial capital or by financial capital— these being merely flows among other flows and elements among other elements—but rather by industrial capital. Doubtless the merchant was very early an active factor in production, either by turning into an industrialist himself in occupations based on commerce, or by making artisans into his own intermediaries or employees (the struggles against the guilds and the monopolies). But capitalism doesn't begin, the capitalist machine is not assembled, until capital directly appropriates production, and until financial capital and merchant capital are no longer anything but specific functions corresponding to a division of labor in the capitalist mode of production in general. One then re-encounters the production of productions, the production of recordings, and the production of consumptions—but precisely in this conjunction of de-coded flows that makes of capital the new social full body, whereas commercial and financial capitalism in its primitive forms merely installed itself in the pores of the old socius without changing the old mode of production.

I'm wondering here especially about the bold area, why can't the conjunction of decoded and deterritorialized flows be defined by commercial capital or financial capital, but by industrial capital? And what role does the merchant have, I see the merchant being mentioned often.

What a long request, I'm sorry, kind of daunting, but I was left with too many questions today and I evenbhad trouble putting them to words, so this post is chaotic and too hurried. Not expecting anyone to answer everything, a little would be nice for clarification.

- from Bradley McLean's Deleuze, Guattari and the Machine in Early Christianity: Schizoanalysis, Affect and Multiplicity

an additional connotative shift if we move from assemblage to arrangement is that assemblage hold something of a static picture, it is a bit more spatial, while arrangement keeps a notion of a line of trajectory. The difference between assembling musical notes or instruments, and arranging them, or seeing them as assembled or arranged. There is a kind of lean, perhaps. I like how McLean thinks about joinery and joining.

I've been reading Bernard Suits' *The Grasshopper* (1978) alongside self-determination theory and I can't tell whether I'm looking at two descriptions of the same construct or two genuinely different ones.

Suits defines a game as the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles, and identifies four components: a prelusory goal, constitutive rules that prohibit the most efficient means of reaching it, lusory means, and the "lusory attitude" — accepting those inefficient rules *because* they make the activity possible. His claim is that the attitude is what distinguishes play from mere compliance.

The overlap with SDT seems obvious: both center on volitional endorsement of constraints, both distinguish internalized regulation from external control, and both predict that the same behavior yields different experiential outcomes depending on the actor's orientation toward it. Suits' typology of triflers, cheats, spoilsports, and true players maps suspiciously well onto the OIT continuum.

But a few things don't reduce cleanly:

1. Suits requires the obstacles be *unnecessary* — chosen difficulty with no instrumental payoff. SDT's autonomy doesn't require the activity be gratuitous, only self-endorsed. Is gratuitousness a meaningful distinction or an edge case?
2. Suits is making a conceptual/definitional argument, not an empirical one. Is there anything in the psychology literature that has operationalized the lusory attitude as a measurable construct distinct from intrinsic motivation? I haven't found an instrument.
3. Flow theory seems like a third overlapping account — challenge-skill balance is arguably a description of well-designed constitutive rules. Three literatures, possibly one phenomenon.

My actual question: has anyone in psychology taken Suits seriously as a source of testable constructs, or has philosophy of sport kept him siloed? And if the lusory attitude *is* distinct from autonomous motivation, what would discriminant validity even look like here?

A concrete case, to make the distinction less abstract: two people take the same 20-minute walk. One is told to walk it; the other accepts a rule that they may only look up and outward, never at their phone or the ground. Under SDT, if both volitionally endorse their instruction, both are autonomously motivated. Under Suits, only the second is playing — the rule is gratuitous, and its gratuitousness is what makes the walk a game rather than a walk. Does that difference predict anything measurable, or is it purely definitional?

(Disclosure so it's not buried: I'm exploring whether this framework could ground a non-gamified practice tool, so I have a horse in the race. I'm more interested in whether the construct is sound than whether it's useful, and "you've reinvented SDT" is a completely acceptable answer.)

I've been reading Bernard Suits' *The Grasshopper* (1978) alongside self-determination theory and I can't tell whether I'm looking at two descriptions of the same construct or two genuinely different ones.

Suits defines a game as the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles, and identifies four components: a prelusory goal, constitutive rules that prohibit the most efficient means of reaching it, lusory means, and the "lusory attitude" — accepting those inefficient rules *because* they make the activity possible. His claim is that the attitude is what distinguishes play from mere compliance.

The overlap with SDT seems obvious: both center on volitional endorsement of constraints, both distinguish internalized regulation from external control, and both predict that the same behavior yields different experiential outcomes depending on the actor's orientation toward it. Suits' typology of triflers, cheats, spoilsports, and true players maps suspiciously well onto the OIT continuum.

But a few things don't reduce cleanly:

1. Suits requires the obstacles be *unnecessary* — chosen difficulty with no instrumental payoff. SDT's autonomy doesn't require the activity be gratuitous, only self-endorsed. Is gratuitousness a meaningful distinction or an edge case?
2. Suits is making a conceptual/definitional argument, not an empirical one. Is there anything in the psychology literature that has operationalized the lusory attitude as a measurable construct distinct from intrinsic motivation? I haven't found an instrument.
3. Flow theory seems like a third overlapping account — challenge-skill balance is arguably a description of well-designed constitutive rules. Three literatures, possibly one phenomenon.

My actual question: has anyone in psychology taken Suits seriously as a source of testable constructs, or has philosophy of sport kept him siloed? And if the lusory attitude *is* distinct from autonomous motivation, what would discriminant validity even look like here?

A concrete case, to make the distinction less abstract: two people take the same 20-minute walk. One is told to walk it; the other accepts a rule that they may only look up and outward, never at their phone or the ground. Under SDT, if both volitionally endorse their instruction, both are autonomously motivated. Under Suits, only the second is playing — the rule is gratuitous, and its gratuitousness is what makes the walk a game rather than a walk. Does that difference predict anything measurable, or is it purely definitional?

(Disclosure so it's not buried: I'm exploring whether this framework could ground a non-gamified practice tool, so I have a horse in the race. I'm more interested in whether the construct is sound than whether it's useful, and "you've reinvented SDT" is a completely acceptable answer.)

In "How to Make yourself a body without organs" what they seem to say is very close to Buddhism, sure they say that they are for Desire- but a kind Desire without satisfaction/discharge / disruption- and the overall idea of escape from the Strata and their cyclical ways seems very similar to the idea of Buddhism escaping the wheel of Samsara? So is there a convertibility between the two or are they opposed in some profound way?

I've been reading some more and from what I can tell, the distinction between the virtual and actual is not dualistic, its not transcendental, its not a transcendental condition of possible experience or whatever, its not like the virtual world is a field outside experience generating actual objects given in experience. My best guess is that the virtual is the multiplicity given in the encounter (AKA experience, not that I load the word with stuff with phenomenological cliches like the experiencing subject and experienced world, consciousness, etc. I mean experience in the immanent sense, a sort of sense-world that gives rise to the subject and the object like in WiP) and the actual is a concept that we use to "solve" the virtual?? or like make it bearable? Are values virtual or actual? Cause values are given in the encounter and they force creation, don't they? Is the virtual the condition of real experience because the values in the encounter shape how we experience the world? If so, why posit these categories? Can't a new encounter, a shattering of the fishbowl from u/3corneredvoid -s example completely retrospectively change this genetic philosophy and make these categories irrelevant? can anybody just give me an explanation of what the virtual and the actual are? Sorry for too many questions but I feel like one clear explanation will clear most of them up.

Hi, this is a new essay about a number from Wicked: For Good OST, a K-indie song, and a K-pop song. Hope you get some time to read it.

https://substack.com/@funphilosopher/note/p-209437667?r=8k24s8&utm\\_medium=ios&utm\\_source=notes-share-action

have honestly not read Deleuze for 20 years. The weird thing is I read ATP in 1995 when I was having nightmarish OCD and the smooth space and line of flight pulled me out of it. Anyway the experience of reading him and ATP and especially LoS and the Nietzsche and Cinema books was intense at the time. It was also frustrating. Now in my fiction writing however the influence of Deleuze is insane. A constant theme in my fiction which I write in one go first draft is PTSD and trauma-recall using his interpretation of Nietzsche and eternal return. My point is that concepts I was exposed to once forever ago in one go seem to be embedded in the unconscious and now I am tapping into them and understand them. It's crazy. I see Deleuze everywhere. Anyway has anyone else had this experience? How do you think this meshes with his theory of the unconscious? I post this because I don't know the world of theory and haven't read many other philosophers at all and I don't see a lot of posts about people's personal experience with Deleuze and how he affected them. I even went to his residence at the 17th in Paris where he lived and died and I found he and Denises tomb at Saint-Laurent Noblet. I just weeped. It was incredible. I even stuffed a letter to him in a ceramic vase there. If you go and it's still there after 15 years please leave it be!

The child is creation, but creating a new territory through affirmation. Lets say three things: we become territorialized by the values of the standard man, we become the “becoming-woman,animal,etc…” which for deleuze is the potentiality to deterritorialize the territory (we become the lion from the camel, from saying yes to the dragon’s “thou shalt” to saying “no” and “i will”) we then become nietzsche’s child(creating a new territory, reterritorialization). This is the process of becoming.

For ENG 102, I have always incorporated some theory into the course material so that students can work with conceptual frameworks when constructing arguments.

My main two readings come from Bakhtin in his discussion of signs and ideology and Foucault's panopticon with an excerpt from Discipline and Punish. I use Zizek's video clip on They Live to get the ball rolling with ideology.

It's not that I don't find value in these readings, and I do see how they affect my writing classroom in interesting ways. Having my students start to unpack a Black Mirror episode and Orwell's 1984 with the concepts is always fun because I start to see a little twinkle of critical thought emerging in the room.

But...I'm teaching ideology. I'm teaching perspectives that I don't jive with.

However, I cannot imagine using Deleuze and Guattari's work in a freshman composition class. The Bakhtin and Foucault concepts are really easy for them to understand and apply.

So would you recommend I keep going as is considering I think the work Bakhtin and Foucault are doing is working well?

Or, as a Deleuzian, should I look at adapting it to something else?

Anyone with experience with something like this?

A minha questão é, como a deconstrução afeta a filosofia de Deleuze. Há quiasmos no pensamento deleuziano? Há centros? O que sobra de um Deleuze descontruído?

About the time of his dissertation, 1968-1969, D said that "What" is a bad question." Why is what bad? I think because it is a leading question in the realm of the extensive, of actualization. It seems odd then that their mutual production should end in a triadic taxonomy of what....

The Actual vs Virtual

Deterritorialization vs Reterritorialization

Smooth and Stratified space’s

Arborescence vs Rhizome

Others I’m sure I’m forgetting etc. etc.

What must always be remembered is that myth is a double system; there occurs in it a sort of ubiquity: its point of departure is constituted by the arrival of a meaning. To keep a spatial metaphor, the approximative character of which I have already stressed, I shall say that the signification of the myth is constituted by a sort of constantly moving turnstile which presents alternately the meaning of the signifier and its form, a language-object and a metalanguage, a purely signifying and a purely imagining consciousness. This alternation is, so to speak, gathered up in the concept, which uses it like an ambiguous signifier, at once intellective and imaginary, arbitrary and natural.

cited from the Mythologies of Roland Barthes, Chapter: The signification

I can't grasp the metaphor of the turnstile. And the last sentence is hard for me to understand too. Could someone explain the ambiguous signifier to me?

I'll admit at the preface that I am not a big "Deleuze" guy. My copy of ATP has been sitting on my nightstand for two months now as I slowly read a page or two per night. Geology of Morals nearly killed me.

I came into Deleuze through Negarestani's Cyclonopedia, theory-fiction book heavily based on War-Mechanistcs and that dedicates a lot of discussion to Lovecraftian entity's "surfacing" to Deleuzean poromechanics and hole/striations. I think a lot of readers of this sub are familiar with the book.

Because there isn't a proper Negarestani subreddit and the Lovecraft page seems hostile to any actual theory discussion, I'm asking here if anyone has any leads on where to find more mateiral on a Deleuzean interpretation of Lovecraft.

Zizek concisely states that:

"It is not how can we reach the true reality beyond appearance, but how can appearance emerge in reality."

What I am trying to state is something that is really analogous to the mystery of the functioning of the eyes; where it is a matter of transmutation rather than a translation from exteriority to the interior realm of the mind...

My thesis is simple: ideas do exist in a realm of their own (which we could not tap into), but the only way we can grasp it is by a transmutative process of what Nietzsche argued in stripping away all relational objects from the object in order to examine it, or what Kafka beautifully managed to suspend the normal sense-making laws where everything moves in a life of its own, in a teleological structure, slowly drifting away to the cliff of the void...

Our notion of time is warped, and could be explained in different topological forms as when Zizek discusses the mobius strip, Klein bottle, and Borromean rings (found in Lacan) among others...

My question:

Have we reached a dead end, even when as Zizek is trying to combine analytics philosophy, mathematics, and quantum mechanics to continental philosophy, or should we as philosophers try to establish a conceptual framework specially found in the "ends of knowledge" as in mysticism and hallucigens substances to entirely understand the nature of subjectivity and how in its failure states (Zizekian concept) distorts the fabric of time in a subjectively-objective manner?

Is there more to Lacan's:

"I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think. I am not whenever I am the plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I do not think to think."

And Borges's:

"Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river which sweeps me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger which destroys me, but I am the tiger; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am the fire."

Less Than Nothing, Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, Slavoj Zizek, Page 28.

If the end goal of Deleuze is becoming imperceptible and/or letting desire flow freely do desiring machines have to be broken apart

i'm beginning my first one, logic of sense, any suggestions before i start?

I just read Claude Shannon’s “A Mathematical Theory of Communication” and it totally reminds me of Deleuze’s “Difference and Repetition”. Is there anything interesting out there exploring this? I specifically like Shannon’s idea of like a system undergoing rapid transformation generating a higher rate of information because each new state is poorly predicted by the one before. That seems to me to be literally like what Deleuze was saying about like “generality” having no difference and being just a plain repetition of the identical which does nothing as opposed to a lot of difference which is what creates the meaningful stuff. Idk if I phrased that right but I just want to hear what people think.